How	We	Think	and	Act	Together Shannon	Spaulding Forthcoming	in	Philosophical	Psychology,	special	issue	on	Collective Intentionality	and	Socially	Extended	Minds,	edited	by	Mattia	Gallotti	and Bryce	Huebner.	Please	cite	only	the	final	version. 1.	Introduction Every	morning	when	I	wake	up,	I	walk	into	the	kitchen	and	make	myself	a	cup	of coffee.	The	typical	folk	psychological	explanation	of	this	behavior	will	make reference	to	my	beliefs,	desires,	and	intentions.	For	instance,	I	believe	that	there	is coffee	in	the	kitchen,	I	desire	to	drink	coffee,	and	I	intend	to	go	to	the	kitchen	to make	coffee	for	myself.	The	typical	scientific	explanation	of	this	behavior	will involve	neuroscientific	facts	about	how	my	brain	operates.	For	example,	information is	sent	from	frontal	lobe	to	the	premotor	cortex	and	then	to	various	muscles,	which generate	and	control	my	movements.	Both	the	folk	psychological	and	scientific explanations	of	my	thinking	and	behavior	focus	on	facts	about	me.	These	are individualistic	explanations.	Most	mainstream	explanations	of	cognition	and	action tend	to	be	individualistic	in	this	way. This	pattern	of	individualistic	explanations	holds	even	for	social	cognition	and	social behavior.	Mainstream	accounts	of	how	we	think	and	act	with	other	people	tend	to focus	on	individuals'	mental	states	and	cognitive	mechanisms.	Suppose	we	are making	coffee	together.	An	individualistic	explanation	of	this	social	interaction	will focus	on	each	individual's	mental	states	(e.g.,	my	intentions,	my	beliefs	about	your intentions,	and	perhaps	even	my	beliefs	about	what	you	think	my	intentions	are) and	individual's	cognitive	mechanisms	(e.g.,	how	in	my	brain	information	is	sent from	the	frontal	lobe	and	the	left	temporal	parietal	junction	to	the	premotor	cortex and	then	to	my	muscles). Individualistic	explanations	of	social	cognition	and	behavior	are	natural,	especially when	seen	as	an	extension	of	how	most	philosophers	and	cognitive	scientists typically	explain	cognition	and	behavior	in	general.	However,	they	are	not	the	only game	in	town.	Some	philosophers	and	cognitive	scientists	argue	for	what	I	call collectivist	explanations	of	cognition	and	behavior.	Collectivist	explanations primarily	focus	on	relational	facts,	i.e.,	facts	about	the	relations	between	an individual	and	her	environment	rather	than	just	facts	about	individuals.	These explanations	shift	the	unit	of	analysis	from	the	individual	to	relations	between	the individual	and	the	world. Various	views	fall	into	the	collectivist	category,	e.g.,	embedded,	embodied,	extended, and	enactive	cognition.	These	views	aim	to	supplement	or	overthrow	(depending	on the	radicalness	of	the	argument)	individualistic	explanations	of	cognition	and 2 behavior.	Collectivist	accounts	of	cognition	and	behavior	focus	on	the	ways	in	which our	environment	influences	how	we	think	and	act,	how	our	bodies	shape	our cognition	and	behavior,	the	coupling	between	our	own	minds	and	external	things and	events,	and	complex	interactions	across	individuals,	objects,	and	events.	In	their application	to	social	cognition	and	behavior,	collectivist	views	emphasize	the importance	of	individuals'	environments,	bodies,	and	other	individuals	in	our	social interactions. My	interest	in	this	paper	is	social	cognition,	so	I	will	focus	primarily	on individualistic	and	collectivist	explanations	of	how	we	think	and	act	together.	I	shall argue	that	individualistic	explanations	neglect	phenomena	important	to	social cognition	that	are	properly	emphasized	by	collectivists.	Although	I	do	not	think	the evidence	or	arguments	warrant	replacing	individualistic	explanations	of	social cognition	with	collectivist	explanations,	I	shall	argue	that	we	have	good	reason	to supplement	our	individualistic	accounts	so	as	to	include	the	ways	in	which situational	context	affect	social	interactions.	The	result,	I	hope,	is	a	more sophisticated	individualism	that	offers	a	more	comprehensive	account	of	how	we think	and	act	together. 2.	Individualistic	and	Collectivist	Accounts	of	Social	Cognition Social	cognition	is	our	capacity	to	understand	and	interact	with	other	agents. Theorizing	about	social	cognition	tends	to	start	with	the	question,	How	does	one understand	what	others	are	thinking,	feeling,	and	doing	and	anticipate	what	they will	think,	feel,	and	do	next?	Given	this	framing,	accounts	of	social	cognition	tend	to focus	on	the	cognitive	processes	of	an	individual	subject.	In	particular,	the	debates about	how	we	understand	others	often	focus	on	the	type	and	content	of	a	subject's mental	representations	in	a	social	interaction. Consider,	for	example,	the	debate	between	the	Theory	Theory	(TT)	and	the Simulation	Theory	(ST).	The	TT	holds	that	we	explain	and	predict	behavior	by employing	a	tacit	folk	psychological	theory	about	how	mental	states	inform behavior	(Carruthers	&	Smith,	1996;	Davies	&	Stone,	1995a;	Nichols	&	Stich,	2003). This	folk	psychological	theory	is	a	rich	body	of	information	about	how	mental	states relate	to	other	mental	states	and	to	behavior.	According	to	this	view,	with	our	folk psychological	theory,	we	infer	from	a	target's	behavior	what	his	or	her	mental	states probably	are,	and	thereby	explain	the	behavior.	From	these	inferences,	plus	the psychological	principles	in	the	theory	connecting	mental	states	to	behavior,	we predict	the	target's	behavior. The	ST,	in	contrast,	holds	that	we	explain	and	predict	a	target's	behavior	by	using our	own	minds	as	a	simulation	of	the	other	person's	mind	(Currie	&	Ravenscroft, 2002;	Davies	&	Stone,	1995b;	Gordon,	1992;	Heal,	1998).	To	explain	a	target's behavior,	we	put	ourselves	in	another's	shoes,	so	to	speak,	and	imagine	what	our mental	states	would	be	and	how	we	would	behave	if	we	were	the	target	in	that 3 particular	situation.	To	predict	a	target's	behavior,	we	take	the	attributed	mental states	as	input	and	simulate	the	target's	decision	about	what	to	do	next.1 Although	TT	and	ST	disagree	about	many	important	aspects	of	social	cognition,	they share	the	individualistic	starting	point.	Their	investigations	are	framed	by	questions about	what	is	happening	in	an	individual	subject's	mind.	The	simulation	theorist posits	that	the	subject	runs	through	a	mental	simulation	of	a	target,	whereas	the theory	theorist	holds	that	the	subject	employs	a	rich	body	of	information	to	come	up with	a	theoretical	inference	about	the	target.	Both	TT	and	ST	appeal	to	a	subject's mental	representations	to	explain	how	we	think	and	act	together. The	TT/ST	debate	is	just	one	illustration	of	the	individualistic	theme	in	social cognition	research.	Other	examples	include	debates	about	how	children	develop mental	state	concepts	(Apperly	&	Butterfill,	2009;	Onishi	&	Baillargeon,	2005; Perner	&	Ruffman,	2005;	Rakoczy,	2012),	whether	understanding	others'	thoughts and	behaviors	requires	introspection	(Goldman,	2006,	p.	187;	Gordon,	1995),	and the	mental	representations	required	to	engage	in	and	recognize	in	others	pretense, sarcasm,	irony,	and	deception,	(Nichols	&	Stich,	2003,	pp.	16-59).	Each	of	these discussions	aims	to	explain	the	mental	representations	of	an	individual	subject	as	a way	of	explaining	how	we	think	and	act	together. Though	the	individualistic	theme	is	common,	it	is	not	universal.	Collectivist	accounts reject	the	individualist	starting	point	for	social	cognition	research.	As	I	mentioned	in the	introduction,	various	views	fall	under	the	category	of	collectivism.	These	include embedded	cognition,	which	focuses	on	how	the	environments	we	inhabit	shape	our cognition	(Aydede	&	Robbins,	2009),	embodied	cognition,	which	focuses	the	way	in which	our	bodies	and	environments	influence	and	perhaps	constitute	cognition (Shapiro,	2010),	extended	cognition,	which	focuses	on	how	dynamic	interactions amongst	agents	and	things	can	constitute	cognition	that	extends	beyond	the	brain and	body	(Menary,	2010),	and	enactive	cognition,	which	focuses	on	how	the dynamic	interaction	between	an	agent	and	her	environment	constitutes	cognition (Stewart,	Gapenne,	&	Di	Paolo,	2010).	This	is	not	the	place	for	an	extended	review	of these	accounts	of	cognition.2	Instead,	I	shall	describe	one	central	example	to illustrate	the	difference	between	individualism	and	collectivism. Embodied	cognition	represents	one	kind	of	collectivist	challenge	to	individualism. Embodied	cognition	objects	to	cognitivism,	the	standard	view	in	cognitive 1	In	addition	to	what	we	might	call	pure	TT	and	pure	ST	are	hybrid	accounts	that incorporate	elements	of	both	TT	and	ST. Hybrid	accounts	aim	to	capture	the theoretical	advantages	of	ST	and	TT	while	avoiding	the	problems	with	both	theories. For	example,	Shaun	Nichols	and	Stephen	Stich	(2003)	have	developed	a	TT-centric hybrid	account,	and	Alvin	Goldman	(2006)	has	developed	a	ST-centric	hybrid account. 2	See	Shapiro	(2014)	for	a	nice	collection	of	papers	on	the	strengths,	weaknesses, and	applications	of	4-E	cognition. 4 psychology.	Cognitivism	holds	that	our	cognitive	capacities	should	be	understood	in terms	of	computational	procedures	operating	on	symbolic,	internal	mental	states, and	thus	cognitive	science	should	be	focused	on	studying	these	internal	states	and processes.	Embodied	cognition	holds	that	cognitivism	makes	the	mistake	of emphasizing	the	mind	as	something	to	be	studied	independently	of	the	body	and	its environment.	According	to	embodied	cognition,	the	emphasis	in	cognitive	science should	be	on	how	the	body	and	the	environment	shape	the	mind. With	respect	to	social	cognition,	embodied	cognition	proponents	reject	both	TT	and ST	accounts	of	how	we	understand	and	interact	with	others.	They	argue	against	the idea	that	social	cognition	is	based	on	an	individual	ascribing	mental	states	to	other agents.	On	the	embodied	cognition	account,	the	capacity	for	more	basic,	nonmentalistic,	interactive	embodied	practices	underlies	our	ability	to	understand	and interact	with	others.	These	embodied	practices	are	constituted	by	"primary intersubjectivity"	and	"secondary	intersubjectivity." Primary	intersubjectivity	is	"the	innate	or	early	developing	capacity	to	interact	with others	manifested	at	the	level	of	perceptual	experience	–	we	see	or	more	generally perceive	in	the	other	person's	bodily	movements,	facial	gestures,	eye	direction,	and so	on,	what	they	intend	and	what	they	feel"	(Gallagher,	2005,	p.	204).	Unlike	the	TT and	ST,	which	focus	on	the	internal	mental	states	of	the	subject,	this	account emphasizes	the	importance	of	informational	sensitivity	and	appropriate responsiveness	to	specific	features	of	one's	environment	and	others'	bodily	cues.	On this	view,	social	cognition	is	underwritten	by	a	subtle	interactive	dance	of	physical cues	that	we	each	exhibit	and	detect. Secondary	intersubjectivity	comes	online	around	age	1,	and	it	is	marked	by	a	move from	one-on-one,	immediate	intersubjectivity	to	contexts	of	shared	attention.	"The defining	feature	of	secondary	intersubjectivity	is	that	an	object	or	event	can	become a	focus	between	people.	Objects	and	events	can	be	communicated	about...	the infant's	interactions	with	another	person	begin	to	have	reference	to	the	things	that surround	them"	(Gallagher,	2005,	p.	207).	At	this	stage,	the	child	learns	to	follow gazes,	point,	and	communicate	with	others	about	objects	of	shared	attention.	Just	as primary	intersubjectivity	concerns	sensitivity	to	others'	bodily	cues	as	opposed	to	a subject's	internal	mental	representations,	secondary	intersubjectivity	focuses	on	the dynamic	interaction	between	subjects	about	an	object	of	shared	attention	rather than	an	individual's	internal	mental	representations. Embodied	cognition	theorists	hold	that	even	as	adults,	primary	and	secondary intersubjectivity	underwrite	most	of	our	social	interactions.	As	adults	we	can,	of course,	represent	others'	mental	states,	but	they	argue	it	is	a	rare,	specialized	skill that	we	employ	only	when	basic,	more	common	interactive	skills	break	down.	Thus, according	to	this	view,	an	accurate	depiction	of	our	ordinary	social	interactions focuses	less	on	individuals'	mental	representations	and	more	on	these	interactive embodied	practices. 5 Proponents	of	embedded,	embodied,	extended,	and	enactive	cognition	offer	a	wide range	of	arguments	with	more	or	less	revolutionary	conclusions.	Some	theorists seem	to	be	offering	a	helpful	corrective	to	cognitivism,	whereas	others	advocate tossing	out	cognitivism	altogether.	I	do	not	think	that	the	arguments	or	evidence from	collectivists	warrant	repealing	and	replacing	the	mainstream	views	in	social cognition.	I	have	argued	extensively	against	the	most	radical	embodied	cognition challenges	to	cognitivist	approaches	to	social	cognition	(Spaulding,	2010,	2011, 2013,	2015).	I	will	not	rehash	those	arguments	here.	Rather	I	shall	simply	note	that	I find	embodied	cognition's	arguments	for	a	social	cognition	revolution	unpersuasive, and	these	arguments	are	relatively	moderate	in	comparison	to	arguments	stemming from	extended	cognition	and	enactivism.	The	latter	views	maintain	that	dynamic interactions	(between	an	agent	and	her	environment,	an	agent	and	another	agent, things	in	the	environment)	somehow	constitute	a	cognitive	process.	I	do	not	think that	proponents	of	these	views	have	sufficiently	rebutted	the	basic	objection	that they	conflate	causal	coupling	with	constitution,	nor	have	they	provided	good reasons	to	think	that	cognitive	science	would	be	better	off	with	collectivist	accounts replacing	individualistic	accounts.	Thus,	I	do	not	find	the	revolutionary	conclusions at	all	persuasive. Nevertheless,	there	is	something	important	to	be	gleaned	from	collectivist challenges.	Collectivists	are	right	that	individualistic	accounts	of	social	cognition focus	too	much	on	the	mental	representations	in	a	subject's	mind.	A	subject's	mental representations	are	an	important,	essential	part	of	the	explanation	of	how	we	think and	act	together,	of	course.	But	individualistic	accounts	tend	to	neglect	aspects	of social	cognition	that	are	not	represented	in	the	subject's	mind,	e.g.,	the	role	of situational	context	in	our	social	interactions.	In	the	next	section,	I	shall	describe	how the	situational	context	influences	in-group/out-group	dynamics,	the	interpretations that	are	salient	to	us,	and	our	own	emotions,	thoughts,	and	behaviors.	These	effects, though	not	emphasized	by	collectivist	accounts	of	social	cognition,	are	collectivist	in spirit.	I	discuss	them	as	friendly	amendments	to	individualistic	accounts	of	social cognition. 3.	Situational	Context Imagine	that	you	are	at	your	university's	library	on	a	weekday	during	the	semester. The	place	is	abuzz	with	muted	activity.	Students	are	reading,	listening	to	music through	headphones,	working	on	their	computers,	and	chatting	in	hushed	tones. Some	clearly	are	studying,	while	others	clearly	are	not.	In	this	context,	certain behaviors	are	expectable,	e.g.,	reading	library	books,	writing	a	paper,	and	doing math	homework.	Other	behaviors	would	be	surprising	in	this	context,	e.g.,	shouting, playing	beer	pong,	and	loudly	singing	the	university's	fight	song. Now	imagine	that	you	are	at	a	football	game	on	your	university's	campus. Thousands	of	people,	both	young	and	old,	are	milling	about	inside	and	outside	the stadium.	People	are	playing	catch,	drinking	beer,	socializing,	and	watching	the 6 football	game.	In	this	context,	shouting,	playing	beer	pong,	and	loudly	singing	the university's	fight	song	are	completely	unsurprising.	These	are	just	the	sorts	of behaviors	you	would	expect	at	a	football	game.	In	contrast,	you	would	be	very surprised	to	see	someone	reading	a	library	book,	writing	a	paper,	or	doing	math homework	at	a	football	game.	The	situational	context	guides	your	expectations	for	a social	interaction.	What	is	normal	and	expectable	in	the	library	is	surprising, perhaps	even	bizarre,	at	the	football	game,	and	vice	versa. The	influence	of	the	situation	on	social	cognition	usually	is	opaque	to	subjects	in	the situation.	Instead	of	reflecting	on	the	fact	that	you	are	at	the	library	or	football	game, you	tend	to	simply	act,	interpret,	and	respond	to	others	in	ways	that	you	assume	to be	appropriate	in	these	situations.	Thus,	you	often	do	not	mentally	represent	the situational	context	or	its	effects	on	your	social	interpretations	and	interactions. Because	individualistic	accounts	of	social	cognition	focus	on	individual	subjects' mental	representations,	they	neglect	aspects	of	social	cognition	that	are	not mentally	represented,	like	the	situational	context.	This	is	unfortunate	in	this	case because	the	situational	context	turns	out	to	be	hugely	influential	in	how	we understand	and	interact	with	other	people.	I	describe	some	of	these	influences	in this	section. 3.1	In-group	and	Out-group	Dynamics Social	interactions	are	deeply	influenced	by	in-group	and	out-group	dynamics.	We habitually	and	rapidly	identify	people	either	as	part	of	our	in-group	or	as	part	of	an out-group	(Tajfel,	1974).	In-grouping	and	out-grouping	appear	to	be	a	function	of perceived	similarity	(Ames,	2004a,	2004b).	That	is,	those	who	we	perceive	to	be	like us	in	some	relevant	respect	are	categorized	as	part	of	our	in-group,	and	those	who we	perceive	to	be	unlike	us	in	the	relevant	respect	are	categorized	as	part	of	an	outgroup. In	heterogeneous	societies,	age,	race,	and	gender	often	are	salient	features	of	people, and	thus	one	tends	to	identify	people	who	share	one's	age,	race,	or	gender	as	part	of one's	in-group.	Although	these	are	reliable	dimensions	of	in-grouping,	social categorization	extends	beyond	these	classifications.	People	have	multiple, overlapping	identities,	and	perceived	similarity	is	relative	to	a	context.	Who	counts as	part	of	one's	in-group	varies	depending	on	the	situational	context. Consider	again	the	library	and	the	football	game.	In	the	context	of	the	library, certain	features	may	be	salient	you,	e.g.,	class	affiliation.	In	that	case,	you	consider	as part	of	your	in-group	people	who	are	enrolled	in	your	class	and	perhaps	can	help you	study,	and	everyone	else	is	considered	the	out-group.	Now	contrast	this	to	the context	of	the	football	game.	At	the	game,	people	associated	with	the	home-team	are part	of	your	in-group,	and	the	people	associated	with	the	visiting	team	are	part	of the	out-group.	In	this	situation,	the	salient	criterion	of	similarity	is	team	allegiance	– often	marked	by	clothing	color	–	and	so	you	regard	all	of	the	people	wearing	certain colors,	cheering	for	the	home	team	as	part	of	your	in-group. 7 The	important	point	to	grasp	is	that	in-groups	and	out-groups	are	not	fixed.	Rather, they	are	contextually	relative.	You	may	perceive	people	to	be	similar	to	you	in	one situational	context	but	not	another.	Thus,	someone	you	regard	as	part	of	the	outgroup	in	the	library	you	may	regard	as	part	of	the	in-group	at	the	football	game.	The situational	context	determines	what	is	salient	and	therefore	the	dimensions	along which	you	classify	people	as	part	of	your	in-group	or	part	of	an	out-group. These	findings	are	important	in	this	discussion	about	how	we	think	and	act	together because	we	treat	in-group	members	quite	differently	from	out-group	members.	We usually	have	more	favorable	attitudes	toward	and	empathize	more	with	in-group members,	especially	people	who	share	our	gender,	race,	age,	religion,	or	nationality than	toward	people	do	not	share	these	features	(Rudman,	Greenwald,	Mellott,	& Schwartz,	1999).	These	social	categories	reliably	generate	in-group	favoritism,	as	do more	explicit	social	groups,	such	as	teams,	universities,	and	professions.	Indeed, experimenters	can	elicit	in-group	favoritism	even	for	very	minimal,	arbitrary	groups (Ashburn-Nardo,	Voils,	&	Monteith,	2001).	By	making	idiosyncratic	features artificially	salient,	e.g.,	eye	color,	first	letter	of	one's	surname,	or	even	randomly assigned	groups,	subjects	will	prefer	individuals	who	happen	to	share	the	arbitrary, idiosyncratic	feature. We	like	and	therefore	more	charitably	interpret	in-group	members	simply	in	virtue of	the	fact	that	we	perceive	them	to	be	like	us	in	some	salient	respect.	The	effects	of in-group	favoritism	are	especially	strong	in	a	context	of	competition	or	threat (Cikara,	Bruneau,	Van	Bavel,	&	Saxe,	2014).	In	those	contexts,	we	will	like	and	be even	more	charitable	toward	in-group	members	and	dislike	and	be	even	less charitable	toward	members	of	out-groups.	Moreover,	in	categorizing	individuals into	in-groups	and	out-groups,	we	gloss	over	differences	within	the	groups	and exaggerate	differences	between	the	groups	(Linville,	Fischer,	&	Salovey,	1989; Mullen	&	Hu,	1989).	Thus,	in	the	context	of	the	football	game,	you	will	tend	to exaggerate	the	differences	between	the	visiting	team	and	the	home	team,	like	and more	charitably	interpret	the	behavior	of	the	home	team,	and	dislike	and uncharitably	interpret	the	behavior	of	the	visiting	team.3	The	same	patterns	apply	to your	reasoning	about	home	team	fans	and	visiting	team	fans,	as	well. In	the	context	of	sports,	these	patterns	seem	innocuous	enough.	But	in	interactions where	more	is	at	stake	than	just	a	sporting	event	victory,	the	effects	can	be	quite 3	In	a	foundational	study	on	this	topic,	Hastorf	and	Cantril	(1954)	found	that students	from	rival	universities	interpreted	a	video	of	a	football	game	between	the rivals	dramatically	differently.	Disagreements	emerged	over	whether	the	game	was played	fairly,	which	team	played	dirty,	whether	particular	penalties	were	justified, whether	a	non-call	was	justified,	the	proportion	of	infractions	made	by	the	other team,	etc.	As	any	sports	fan	knows,	one's	allegiance	to	a	team	colors	one's interpretation	of	what	happens	in	the	game.	This	is	one	reason	why	media	outlets now	offer	"team	stream"	programming,	curated	and	narrated	by	fans	of	your	team. 8 serious.	Think	of	political	debates	about	same-sex	marriage,	welfare	benefits,	the refugee	crisis,	etc.	In	these	cases,	perceived	similarity	to	people	on	one	side	of	the debate,	especially	in	a	context	of	threat	or	competition	for	resources,	generates	ingroup	favoritism	with	very	serious	consequences.	In	such	cases,	we	regard	in-group members	as	more	human,	in	a	sense,	than	out-group	members	(Hackel,	Looser,	& Van	Bavel,	2014).	We	regard	in-group	members	as	more	capable	of	experiencing secondary	emotions	(such	as	pride	and	guilt)	and	as	having	richer,	more	complex mental	experiences	than	out-group	members	(Haslam,	2006).	We	tend	to	attribute more	simplistic,	caricatured	mental	states	to	those	we	perceive	to	be	unlike	us.	At the	extreme,	people	tend	to	dehumanize	those	individuals	who	are	perceived	to	be least	like	them,	e.g.,	the	homeless	and	drug	addicts	(L.	T.	Harris	&	Fiske,	2006).	In these	cases,	we	tend	not	to	attribute	mental	states	to	such	people	at	all,	treating them	more	like	animals	or	even	objects	than	fellow	humans. In-group/out-group	identification	also	affects	how	we	interpret	others'	behavior and	mental	states.	For	example,	when	we	perceive	an	individual	to	be	similar	to	us in	some	salient	respect,	we	often	simply	project	our	own	mental	states	to	that individual	(Ames,	2004a,	2004b).	We	also	use	our	mental	states	as	an	anchor	and adjust	the	interpretation	based	on	how	similar	the	individual	is	to	us.	These egocentric	heuristics	make	interactions	between	in-group	members	easier	and smoother	than	interactions	with	out-group	members.4	In	these	cases,	we	find	it easier	to	think	and	act	with	other	people. When	we	perceive	an	individual	to	be	different	from	us,	we	tend	to	take	a	different approach.	Often	we	use	stereotypes	about	the	individual's	salient	in-group	(Ames, 2004a;	Krueger,	1998;	Vorauer,	Hunter,	Main,	&	Roy,	2000).	Stereotypes	may	be positive,	negative,	or	neutral	beliefs	about	some	group.	Reliance	on	stereotypes	is	a shortcut	that	reduces	cognitive	load,	and	once	the	stereotype	is	activated, processing	stereotype-consistent	information	is	less	cognitively	demanding	than processing	stereotype-inconsistent	information.	Thus,	especially	when	subjects	are under	cognitive	load,	they	will	employ	a	stereotype	and	attend	to	stereotypeinconsistent	information	only	if	it	is	highly	salient	(Gilbert	&	Hixon,	1991). Putting	all	of	this	together,	the	situational	context	frames	our	social	interactions, e.g.,	as	one	of	competition	or	collaboration.	The	situational	context	makes	certain features	salient	to	us,	e.g.,	team	allegiance	or	class	affiliation.	On	the	basis	of	these salient	features,	we	perceive	others	as	part	of	an	in-group	or	an	out-group.	Ingroup/out-group	status	significantly	affects	how	much	we	like	and	charitably interpret	others,	and	thus	how	smoothly	the	interaction	proceeds.	It	affects	the strategies	we	use	to	interpret	others	behavior,	e.g.,	projection	or	stereotyping.	And	it 4	When	these	egocentric	heuristics	go	awry,	they	generate	the	"curse	of	knowledge," a	phenomenon	wherein	we	falsely	assume	that	others	know	what	we	know,	and	the "false	consensus	effect,"	which	occurs	when	we	falsely	assume	that	others	share	our opinion	on	some	matter	(Clement	&	Krueger,	2002;	Epley	&	Waytz,	2010,	p.	512). 9 even	affects	whether	we	attribute	mental	states	to	someone	perceived	to	be	very unlike	us. Individualistic	accounts	of	social	cognition	focus	on	the	front-end	product	–	mental representation	of	others'	mental	states.	But	unless	you	consider	the	ways	in	which the	situational	context	influences	in-group/out-group	dynamics,	you	cannot	fully understand	how	we	come	to	have	these	particular	mental	representations.	Thus,	a more	complete	account	of	social	cognition	must	recognize	the	role	of	situational context	in	social	cognition	and	interaction. 3.2	Expectations	and	Interpretations As	adults,	we	rarely	are	completely	clueless	about	what	to	expect	in	a	social interaction.	In	most	cases,	we	have	some	expectations	about	how	the	interaction	will go,	even	if	those	expectations	turn	out	to	be	violated.	The	situational	context	and	our past	experiences	are	the	source	of	our	expectations	about	what	will	happen	in	social interactions.	As	we	saw	in	our	university	themed	examples	above,	at	the	library	we expect	to	see	students	reading,	writing,	and	doing	homework,	and	at	the	football game	we	expect	to	see	people	cheering,	playing	games,	etc.	We	have	these expectations	based	on	the	context	and	our	knowledge	about	such	environments. This	banal	fact	about	our	expectations	in	social	interactions	is	related	to	a	more interesting	fact	about	our	interpretations	of	social	interactions.	Our	interpretations of	what	happens	in	a	social	interaction	are	shaped	of	course	by	what	we	see,	but	also by	what	we	expect	to	see.	When	you	are	at	the	library	you	tend	to	interpret	social interactions	to	be	in	line	with	what	you	know	about	university	libraries,	e.g.,	the kind	of	people	who	go	to	libraries	and	the	social	norms	of	libraries.	So	long	as behavior	does	not	overtly	thwart	the	norms	of	the	library,	you	will	interpret observed	behavior	in	terms	of	what	you	expect	to	see	in	that	context. These	facts	imply	that	the	very	same	behavior	in	one	situational	context	may	be interpreted	radically	differently	in	another	situational	context	(Gilbert	&	Hixon, 1991;	Trope,	1986).	For	example,	keeping	one's	distance	and	limiting	eye	contact	on public	transportation	is	normal	behavior,	but	doing	this	at	a	party	would	be	rude and	anti-social.	The	situational	context	influences	spontaneous	personality	trait inferences,	as	well.	We	may	infer	that	the	eye-contact-avoiding	partygoer	is awkward	or	rude,	but	in	a	different	context	the	very	same	behavior	would	lead	us	to a	different	inference. In	general,	the	situational	context	makes	certain	interpretations	more	accessible, i.e.,	our	attention	is	primed	for	these	interpretations	(Wittenbrink,	Judd,	&	Park, 2001).	These	interpretations	will	be	more	salient	to	us	than	otherwise	plausible	but unconsidered	interpretations.	As	particular	situations	become	more	familiar	to	us, the	interpretation	of	those	situations	will	become	more	accessible	and	more	difficult to	override	(Higgins,	King,	&	Mavin,	1982).	The	tendency	to	habitually	code 10 situations	and	others'	behavior	in	a	particular	way	can	become	proceduralized. Well-practiced	judgments	make	social	interpretation	easier,	more	efficient,	and more	predictable,	but	they	preempt	equally	reasonable	but	less	practiced	judgments (Smith,	1990). The	examples	used	to	illustrate	the	foregoing	discussion	are	innocuous	enough,	but it	is	not	hard	to	see	how	the	situational	context's	influence	on	our	expectations	and interpretations	can	have	pernicious	effects.	Think	about	the	Trayvon	Martin	case, where	a	self-appointed	neighborhood	watchman	shot	and	killed	Martin,	a	black teenage	boy	who	was	wearing	a	hoodie	and	eating	Skittles	while	walking	through his	neighborhood	at	night.	Or	consider	the	case	of	Tamir	Rice,	a	12-year-old	black boy	who	was	playing	with	a	toy	gun	in	a	park	in	broad	daylight	and	was	shot	and killed	by	police	within	seconds	of	their	arrival	at	the	scene.	In	these	and	many	other cases,	it	is	not	hard	to	see	how	the	shooters'	past	experiences	and	situational context	shaped	their	expectations	and	interpretations	of	the	situations,	to	tragic consequences.	In	both	cases,	reasonable,	benign,	true	interpretations	of	Martin	and Rice's	behavior	were	possible.	It	is	hard	to	know	the	psychology	of	the	shooters,	but a	plausible	hypothesis	is	that	they	so	frequently	interpreted	young	black	men	(and children,	apparently)	as	dangerous	that	this	tendency	became	proceduralized,	and they	did	not	even	consider	plausible	alternative	interpretations.	Again,	this	is speculation	about	the	psychology	of	individual	people,	but	it	is	one	that	seems imminently	plausible	in	light	of	what	cognitive	and	social	psychology	tell	us	about how	situational	context	and	habits	influence	our	expectations	and	interpretations	of social	interactions. Returning	to	the	issue	of	individualism	and	collectivism,	recall	that	individualistic accounts	of	social	cognition	focus	on	a	subject's	mental	representations	in	social interactions.	From	the	first	person	perspective,	it	is	opaque	to	us	how	the	situational context	and	our	habits	shape	our	expectations	and	interpretations	of	social interactions.	In	the	process	of	interpreting	a	social	interaction,	it	seems	to	us	that certain	expectations	and	interpretations	just	occur	to	us	unbidden.	Of	course	we	can and	sometimes	should	deliberate	carefully	in	search	of	alternative	interpretations, but	the	relevant	point	here	is	that	we	as	interpreters	do	not	mentally	represent	how the	situation	influences	our	expectations	and	interpretations.	As	a	result, individualistic	accounts	focused	on	mental	representations	neglect	the	important role	of	the	situational	context	in	generating	the	mental	representations	we	end	up having. 3.3	Priming	Effects As	I	discussed	in	3.1	and	3.2,	the	situational	context	influences	in-group/out-group dynamics	and	our	expectations	and	interpretations	in	social	interactions.	In	addition to	these	dramatic	effects	on	social	cognition,	the	situational	context	also	includes subtle	cues	in	the	environment	that	can	affect	our	interpretation	of	the	social interaction.	These	are	priming	effects,	and	they	influence	our	emotional,	cognitive, and	possibly	behavioral	responses	in	social	situations	(Bargh,	Chen,	&	Burrows, 11 1996;	DeCoster	&	Claypool,	2004;	Fiske	&	Taylor,	2013,	pp.	32-37).	Subliminal priming	occurs	when	a	stimulus	is	presented	to	subjects	too	quickly	to	be consciously	processed.	Conscious	priming	occurs	when	the	subject	consciously perceives	the	prime	but	has	no	awareness	of	its	effects	on	subsequent	reactions. There	is	robust	evidence	for	affective	priming.	When	negative	stimuli,	e.g.,	angry faces	or	emotionally	arousing	words,	are	presented	either	subliminally	or consciously,	this	influences	subjects'	facial	expressions,	mood,	and	affective responses	to	stimuli	that	are	unrelated	to	the	primed	stimuli.	In	other	words,	if primed	with	negative	stimuli	(e.g.,	frowning	faces),	one's	responses	to	neutral stimuli	(e.g.,	Chinese	ideographs)	will	be	more	negative	than	if	one	were	not	primed with	negative	stimuli	(Murphy,	Monahan,	&	Zajonc,	1995).	Affective	priming	also works	when	subjects	are	primed	with	positive	stimuli	(Monahan,	Murphy,	&	Zajonc, 2000).	These	data	suggest	that	subtle	affective	cues	in	the	environment	influence one's	own	affective	state.	Furthermore,	one's	affective	state	influences	one's	social interpretations.	Our	judgments	about	other	people	tend	to	correlate	with	our	own mood.	For	example,	when	we	are	in	a	positive	mood,	we	form	more	favorable impressions	than	when	we	are	in	a	negative	mood	(Forgas	&	Bower,	1987).	Thus, processing	subtle	negative	or	positive	stimuli	in	the	environment	alters	our	own affective	states,	which	biases	our	social	interpretations	and	interactions	with	others. In	addition	to	affective	priming,	many	studies	also	find	evidence	of	cognitive priming,	which	occurs	when	subtle	cues	in	the	environment	activate	concepts	and influence	subjects'	judgments.	For	example,	Kawakami,	Dovidio,	and	Dijksterhuis (2003)	found	that	subjects	primed	either	subliminally	or	consciously	with	words related	to	the	elderly	expressed	more	conservative	attitudes	than	those	not	primed with	elderly-related	words,	and	subjects	primed	with	the	skinhead	category expressed	more	prejudicial	attitudes.	With	respect	to	social	cognition,	Graham	and Lowery	(2004)	found	that	police	officers	and	juvenile	probation	officers subliminally	primed	with	words	related	to	the	racial	category	black	were	more likely	to	interpret	a	hypothetical	adolescent	(whose	race	is	unspecified)	as	having	a worse	personality,	being	more	blameworthy,	more	likely	to	reoffend,	and	they recommended	harsher	punishments.	In	this	case,	activating	the	racial	category	black (in	subjects	who	seem	to	have	underlying	racial	biases)	affected	their	judgments about	a	hypothetical	offender	whose	race	is	unspecified.	In	general,	the	situational context	can	activate	subjects'	concepts,	which	makes	certain	judgments	and interpretations	more	salient	to	subjects. Finally,	there	is	evidence	that	primed	stimuli	can	influence	not	just	how	we	feel	and think	but	also	how	we	behave.	The	data	for	behavioral	priming	are	mixed	and complicated,	but	some	studies	suggest	that	primed	stimuli	can	influence	our behavior.	For	example,	in	a	set	of	now	famous	studies,	Bargh	et	al.	(1996)	found	that after	subliminal	exposure	to	African	American	faces,	subjects	reacted	to	an	annoying task	request	with	increased	irritability,	hostility,	anger,	and	uncooperativeness	(as rated	by	the	experimenter).	In	the	same	article,	Bargh	and	colleagues	report	that priming	subjects	with	words	associated	with	the	elderly	influenced	how	slowly	they 12 walked,	and	priming	subjects	with	rude	words	influenced	how	quickly	and frequently	they	interrupted	the	experimenters. Though	many	studies	–	far	too	many	to	review	here	–	have	found	evidence	of priming	effects,	we	should	be	cautious.	There	has	been	significant	controversy	over the	failure	to	replicate	behavioral	priming	studies,	such	as	the	ones	described	above (C.	R.	Harris,	Coburn,	Rohrer,	&	Pashler,	2013;	Yong,	2012).	The	difficulty	in replicating	priming	effects	does	not	imply	that	behavioral	priming	never	occurs. After	all,	priming	effects	depend	on	subtle	factors	that	may	be	difficult	to	replicate.5 But	we	should	be	careful	about	what	we	conclude	from	these	studies.	On	the	one hand,	these	considerations	suggest	that	it	is	not	so	problematic	that	some behavioral	priming	studies	have	not	been	replicated.	On	the	other	hand,	given	how sensitive	to	context	such	effects	are,	we	may	not	be	able	to	generalize	from	these behavioral	priming	studies	to	predictions	about	how	individuals	will	behave	in different	situations.6 Summing	up,	although	there	may	be	reason	to	withhold	judgment	on	the	robustness and	generalizability	of	studies	on	behavioral	priming	effects,	there	is	substantial evidence	for	affective	and	cognitive	priming.	Even	if	subtle	cues	in	the	environment do	not	reliably	directly	influence	behavior,	these	cues	will	indirectly	affect	behavior by	influencing	our	emotions	and	cognition.	How	we	feel	and	think	about	others	in social	interactions	certainly	has	an	effect	on	how	we	interact	with	others. Mainstream	individualistic	views	in	the	social	cognition	literature	tend	not	to	focus much	on	priming	effects.7	Though	priming	effects	may	be	less	dramatic	than	the effects	of	situational	context	on	in-group/out-group	dynamics	and	our	expectations and	interpretations,	they	are	nonetheless	important.	Priming	effects	demonstrate that	we	do	not	observe	and	interpret	others'	behavior	in	a	vacuum.	How	we	think and	act	with	other	people	is	shaped	by	subtle	cues	in	the	environment.	Broadening 5	Replication	studies	may	be	direct	or	conceptual.	Direct	replications	try	to reproduce	exactly	the	same	result	using	exactly	the	same	methods	as	the	original study.	Direct	replications	are	difficult,	especially	when	the	effects	depend	on	subtle factors.	Even	when	researchers	are	fully	forthcoming	about	the	methods	of	the original	study,	it	may	be	difficult	to	replicate	exactly	the	same	methods.	In	contrast, conceptual	replications	try	to	test	the	experiment's	underlying	hypothesis	by	using different	methods.	The	trouble	with	conceptual	replication	of	priming	studies	is	that priming	effects	are	highly	sensitive	to	variations	in	the	features	of	the	experiment and	the	pool	of	subjects.	Thus,	it	may	be	difficult	to	get	the	same	results	with different	methodology	and	different	subjects.	Failure	to	conceptually	replicate priming	studies	does	not	imply	that	there	is	no	priming	effect. 6	See	De	Houwer,	Teige-Mocigemba,	Spruyt,	and	Moors	(2009)	for	an	analysis	and review	of	the	literature	on	implicit	measures	and	priming	effects. 7	One	exception	here	is	Goldman.	Though	he	does	not	focus	on	these	effects,	he briefly	suggests	that	priming	effects	may	be	the	result	of	covert	mental	simulation involving	primed	stimuli	(Goldman,	2006,	pp.	161-162). 13 our	focus	beyond	an	individual's	mental	representations	and	thinking	of	social cognition	and	interaction	more	like	a	collectivist	opens	our	eyes	to	the	effects	of	the environment	on	how	we	think	and	act	together. 4.	Conclusion Individualistic	accounts	of	social	cognition	primarily	focus	on	individual	subjects' mental	representations	in	thinking	about	and	interacting	with	other	people.	These accounts	implicitly	sterilize	the	environments	in	which	we	think	and	act	with	other people.	They	presuppose	that	situational	contexts	are	neutral	and	do	not significantly	influence	social	cognition	and	interaction.	In	contrast,	collectivist accounts	focus	on	these	environments,	sometimes	to	the	exclusion	of	an	individual subject's	mental	representations.	Although	I	reject	the	most	radical	collectivist claims,	individualistic	accounts	can	benefit	from	considering	some	phenomena	that are	more	collectivist	in	spirit. In	this	paper,	I	examined	how	our	environments	shape	our	social	thoughts	and actions.	In	particular,	I	argued	that	the	situational	context	makes	certain	features	of individuals	salient	to	us.	We	use	these	features	to	demarcate	in-groups	and	outgroups,	and	in-grouping	and	out-grouping	significantly	affect	how	we	interpret others'	behavior.	The	situational	context	also	influences	our	expectations	and interpretations	in	particular	environments.	The	effects	of	this	can	be	quite	dramatic in	some	situations,	as	I	explored	in	discussing	the	cases	of	Trayvon	Martin	and Tamir	Rice.	Finally,	I	argued	that	the	situational	context	includes	subtle	cues	that prime	our	own	emotions,	concepts,	and	behavior.	Stimuli	in	the	environment	seem to	affect	how	we	feel,	think,	and	act	in	ways	that	are	opaque	to	introspection. In	all	three	of	these	cases,	the	situational	context	shapes	the	mental	representations we	have	in	social	interactions.	Focusing	only	on	the	end	product	–	the	mental representations	we	happen	to	have	–	neglects	a	crucial	part	of	story	of	how	we	think and	act	together.	In	particular,	it	leaves	unexplained	why	we	have	these	particular mental	representations.	The	phenomena	I	have	discussed	here	shed	light	on	how the	situational	context	shapes	the	mental	representations	we	have	in	various situations.	Thus,	these	phenomena	are	important	for	individualistic	accounts	that aim	to	give	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	social	cognition	and	interaction. References Ames,	D.	R.	(2004a).	Inside	the	mind	reader's	tool	kit:	projection	and	stereotyping	in mental	state	inference.	Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	87(3), 340. Ames,	D.	R.	(2004b).	Strategies	for	social	inference:	a	similarity	contingency	model of	projection	and	stereotyping	in	attribute	prevalence	estimates.	Journal	of Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	87(5),	573. 14 Apperly,	I.	A.,	&	Butterfill,	S.	A.	(2009).	Do	humans	have	two	systems	to	track	beliefs and	belief-like	states.	Psychological	Review,	116(4),	953. Ashburn-Nardo,	L.,	Voils,	C.	I.,	&	Monteith,	M.	J.	(2001).	Implicit	associations	as	the seeds	of	intergroup	bias:	How	easily	do	they	take	root?	Journal	of	Personality and	Social	Psychology,	81(5),	789. Aydede,	M.,	&	Robbins,	P.	(2009).	The	Cambridge	handbook	of	situated	cognition: Cambridge	University	Press	New	York,	NY. Bargh,	J.	A.,	Chen,	M.,	&	Burrows,	L.	(1996).	Automaticity	of	social	behavior:	Direct effects	of	trait	construct	and	stereotype	activation	on	action.	Journal	of Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	71(2),	230. Carruthers,	P.,	&	Smith,	P.	K.	(1996).	Theories	of	Theories	of	Mind.	Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press. Cikara,	M.,	Bruneau,	E.,	Van	Bavel,	J.,	&	Saxe,	R.	(2014).	Their	pain	gives	us	pleasure: How	intergroup	dynamics	shape	empathic	failures	and	counter-empathic responses.	Journal	of	Experimental	Social	Psychology,	55,	110-125. Clement,	R.	W.,	&	Krueger,	J.	(2002).	Social	categorization	moderates	social projection.	Journal	of	Experimental	Social	Psychology,	38(3),	219-231. Currie,	G.,	&	Ravenscroft,	I.	(2002).	Recreative	Minds:	Imagination	in	Philosophy	and Psychology.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Davies,	M.,	&	Stone,	T.	(1995a).	Folk	Psychology:	The	Theory	of	Mind	Debate.	Oxford: Blackwell. Davies,	M.,	&	Stone,	T.	(1995b).	Mental	Simulation:	Evaluations	and	Applications. Oxford:	Blackwell. De	Houwer,	J.,	Teige-Mocigemba,	S.,	Spruyt,	A.,	&	Moors,	A.	(2009).	Implicit measures:	A	normative	analysis	and	review.	Psychological	Bulletin,	135(3), 347. DeCoster,	J.,	&	Claypool,	H.	M.	(2004).	A	meta-analysis	of	priming	effects	on impression	formation	supporting	a	general	model	of	informational	biases. Personality	and	social	psychology	review,	8(1),	2-27. Epley,	N.,	&	Waytz,	A.	(2010).	Mind	perception.	In	S.	T.	Fiske,	D.	T.	Gilbert,	&	G. Lindzey	(Eds.),	Handbook	of	Social	Psychology	(5th	ed.,	Vol.	1,	pp.	498-451). Hoboken,	NJ:	Wiley. 15 Fiske,	S.	T.,	&	Taylor,	S.	E.	(2013).	Social	cognition:	From	brains	to	culture:	Sage. Forgas,	J.	P.,	&	Bower,	G.	H.	(1987).	Mood	effects	on	person-perception	judgments. Journal	of	personality	and	social	psychology,	53(1),	53. Gallagher,	S.	(2005).	How	the	Body	Shapes	the	Mind:	Oxford	University	Press,	USA. Gilbert,	D.	T.,	&	Hixon,	J.	G.	(1991).	The	trouble	of	thinking:	activation	and application	of	stereotypic	beliefs.	Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology, 60(4),	509. Goldman,	A.	I.	(2006).	Simulating	Minds:	The	Philosophy,	Psychology,	and Neuroscience	of	Mindreading:	Oxford	University	Press,	USA. Gordon,	R.	M.	(1992).	The	Simulation	Theory:	Objections	and	Misconceptions.	Mind &	Language,	7(1-2),	11-34. Gordon,	R.	M.	(1995).	Simulation	Without	Introspection	or	Inference	From	Me	to You,.	In	M.	Davies	&	T.	Stone	(Eds.),	Mental	Simulation:	Evaluations	and Applications	(pp.	53-67).	Oxford:	Blackwell. Graham,	S.,	&	Lowery,	B.	S.	(2004).	Priming	unconscious	racial	stereotypes	about adolescent	offenders.	Law	and	Human	Behavior,	28(5),	483. Hackel,	L.	M.,	Looser,	C.	E.,	&	Van	Bavel,	J.	J.	(2014).	Group	membership	alters	the threshold	for	mind	perception:	The	role	of	social	identity,	collective identification,	and	intergroup	threat.	Journal	of	Experimental	Social Psychology,	52,	15-23. Harris,	C.	R.,	Coburn,	N.,	Rohrer,	D.,	&	Pashler,	H.	(2013).	Two	failures	to	replicate high-performance-goal	priming	effects.	PloS	one,	8(8),	e72467. Harris,	L.	T.,	&	Fiske,	S.	T.	(2006).	Dehumanizing	the	lowest	of	the	low	neuroimaging responses	to	extreme	out-groups.	Psychological	Science,	17(10),	847-853. Haslam,	N.	(2006).	Dehumanization:	An	integrative	review.	Personality	and	social psychology	review,	10(3),	252-264. Hastorf,	A.	H.,	&	Cantril,	H.	(1954).	They	saw	a	game;	a	case	study.	The	Journal	of Abnormal	and	Social	Psychology,	49(1),	129. Heal,	J.	(1998).	Co-cognition	and	off-line	simulation:	Two	ways	of	understanding	the simulation	approach.	Mind	&	Language,	13(4),	477-498. 16 Higgins,	E.	T.,	King,	G.	A.,	&	Mavin,	G.	H.	(1982).	Individual	construct	accessibility	and subjective	impressions	and	recall.	Journal	of	Personality	and	Social Psychology,	43(1),	35. Kawakami,	K.,	Dovidio,	J.	F.,	&	Dijksterhuis,	A.	(2003).	Effect	of	social	category priming	on	personal	attitudes.	Psychological	Science,	14(4),	315-319. Krueger,	J.	(1998).	On	the	perception	of	social	consensus.	Advances	in	experimental social	psychology,	30,	164-240. Linville,	P.	W.,	Fischer,	G.	W.,	&	Salovey,	P.	(1989).	Perceived	distributions	of	the characteristics	of	in-group	and	out-group	members:	empirical	evidence	and	a computer	simulation.	Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	57(2),	165. Menary,	R.	(2010).	The	Extended	Mind.	Cambridge,	MA:	Mit	Press. Monahan,	J.	L.,	Murphy,	S.	T.,	&	Zajonc,	R.	B.	(2000).	Subliminal	mere	exposure: Specific,	general,	and	diffuse	effects.	Psychological	Science,	11(6),	462-466. Mullen,	B.,	&	Hu,	L.-t.	(1989).	Perceptions	of	ingroup	and	outgroup	variability:	A meta-analytic	integration.	Basic	and	Applied	Social	Psychology,	10(3),	233252. Murphy,	S.	T.,	Monahan,	J.	L.,	&	Zajonc,	R.	B.	(1995).	Additivity	of	nonconscious affect:	combined	effects	of	priming	and	exposure.	Journal	of	personality	and social	psychology,	69(4),	589. Nichols,	S.,	&	Stich,	S.	(2003).	Mindreading:	An	Integrated	Account	of	Pretence,	SelfAwareness,	and	Understanding	Other	Minds.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Onishi,	K.	H.,	&	Baillargeon,	R.	(2005).	Do	15-month-old	infants	understand	false beliefs?	Science,	308(5719),	255-258. Perner,	J.,	&	Ruffman,	T.	(2005).	Infants'	insight	into	the	mind:	How	deep?	Science, 308(5719),	214. Rakoczy,	H.	(2012).	Do	infants	have	a	theory	of	mind?	British	Journal	of Developmental	Psychology,	30(1),	59-74.	doi:10.1111/j.2044835X.2011.02061.x Rudman,	L.	A.,	Greenwald,	A.	G.,	Mellott,	D.	S.,	&	Schwartz,	J.	L.	(1999).	Measuring	the automatic	components	of	prejudice:	Flexibility	and	generality	of	the	Implicit Association	Test.	Social	cognition,	17(4),	437-465. Shapiro,	L.	(2010).	Embodied	Cognition.	New	York:	Routledge. 17 Shapiro,	L.	(Ed.)	(2014).	The	Routledge	Handbook	Of	Embodied	Cognition.	New	York, NY:	Routledge. Smith,	E.	R.	(1990).	Content	and	Process	Specificity	in	the	Effects	of	Prior Experiences.	In	T.	K.	Srull	&	R.	S.	Wyer	(Eds.),	Advances	in	Social	Cognition (Vol.	3,	pp.	1-59).	Hillsdale,	NJ:	Erlbaum. Spaulding,	S.	(2010).	Embodied	cognition	and	mindreading.	Mind	&	Language,	25(1), 119-140. Spaulding,	S.	(2011).	A	critique	of	embodied	simulation.	Review	of	Philosophy	and Psychology,	2(3),	579-599. Spaulding,	S.	(2013).	Embodied	social	cognition.	Philosophical	Topics,	39(1),	141162. Spaulding,	S.	(2015).	Phenomenology	of	Social	Cognition.	Erkenntnis,	80(5),	10691089. Stewart,	J.	R.,	Gapenne,	O.,	&	Di	Paolo,	E.	A.	(2010).	Enaction:	Toward	a	new paradigm	for	cognitive	science:	MIT	Press. Tajfel,	H.	(1974).	Social	identity	and	intergroup	behaviour.	Social	Science Information,	13(2),	65-93. Trope,	Y.	(1986).	Identification	and	inferential	processes	in	dispositional	attribution. Psychological	Review,	93(3),	239. Vorauer,	J.	D.,	Hunter,	A.,	Main,	K.	J.,	&	Roy,	S.	A.	(2000).	Meta-stereotype	activation: evidence	from	indirect	measures	for	specific	evaluative	concerns experienced	by	members	of	dominant	groups	in	intergroup	interaction. Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	78(4),	690. Wittenbrink,	B.,	Judd,	C.	M.,	&	Park,	B.	(2001).	Spontaneous	prejudice	in	context: variability	in	automatically	activated	attitudes.	Journal	of	Personality	and Social	Psychology,	81(5),	815. Yong,	E.	(2012).	In	the	wake	of	high	profile	controversies,	psychologists	are	facing up	to	problems	with	replication.	Nature,	483,	298-300.